Abstract. In this paper, we examine individual preferences toward skilled immigration in the United States. We ask whether individuals are less opposed to immigration in states with moreskilled immigrant populations. Previous literature suggests that attitudes about immigration depend on an individual's skill level, the size of the immigrant population in an individual's state, and the exposure of an individual to the fiscal consequences to immigration. We investigate the consequences of the skill composition of immigrants on policy opinions. Our main finding is that skill composition does matter, but not across the board. Less-skilled natives are less opposed to immigration when living in states with a relatively skilled mix of immigrants. The sensitivity of less-skilled natives' opinions to the skill composition of immigrants resonates with earlier findings that the labor-market pressures of immigration are an important determinant of policy opinions about immigration restrictions.
Introduction
In the United States, immigration is a source of intense political conflict. Despite widespread criticism of U.S. immigration practices, there is little consensus about how to change the management of immigrant inflows. Current immigration policy is viewed as allowing a large number of illegal aliens to enter the United States, increasing the supply of low-skilled labor in the country, and admitting individuals who place large demands on public expenditure. These outcomes, in turn, are blamed for expanding the underground economy, hurting low-income U.S.
workers, and increasing fiscal deficits.
Among the more sweeping proposals for reforming U.S. immigration is the suggestion to replace the current system, in which legal admissions of permanent immigrants are based primarily on family reunification, with one in which admissions are instead based on the skill set that an individual possesses (Borjas, 1999; Huntington, 2004) . Shifting from a family-based to a skills-based admissions criterion, the reasoning goes, would allow the United States to select individuals who have high earnings potential, good prospects for succeeding in the U.S. economy, and a low likelihood of drawing on public benefits. 1 It is unclear, however, whether there is sufficient political support to shift U.S. policy towards favoring high-skilled immigrants. The public is sharply divided over immigration.
When asked about the level of U.S. immigration, nearly half of survey respondents would prefer to see the numbers admitted reduced (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001a ). This opposition is surely conditional on the nature of U.S. policies. But would changing admissions criteria reduce opposition to immigration sufficiently to make reform of U.S. immigration feasible?
Previous research offers many reasons to think the answer may be, "yes." Skilled immigrants have been shown to be a source of entrepreneurial activity. For example, during the 1990s information-technology boom in Silicon Valley, Chinese and Indian immigrants started new companies at an accelerating rate and accounted for 25% of the senior executives at all startup firms (Saxenian, 1999) . Firms started by and/or populated by immigrants forge a wide range of international networks with home countries and elsewhere, which may foster economic growth by facilitating cross-border flows of ideas, capital, and goods and services (Rauch, 2001; Rauch and Trindade, 2002; Saxenian, 2002b) . More generally, in recent decades skilled immigrants-many of whom were educated at American universities-have accounted for sharply increasing shares of very highly skilled segments of the U.S. labor force that are critical for supporting highly productive, highly compensated jobs. By 2000, 38% of all American PhDs in science and engineering occupations were foreign born-up from only 23% in 1990 (National Science Foundation, 2004) . This evidence on the potential dynamic benefits from skilled immigrants might make natives more inclined to favor liberalization of immigration policy where they are more exposed to skilled immigration.
In this paper, we examine individual preferences toward skilled immigration in the United
States. In particular, we ask whether individuals are less opposed to immigration in states with more-skilled immigrant populations. To implement the analysis, we combine micro data on public attitudes toward immigration with data on the size and composition of U.S. immigrant populations across regions and over time.
That opinions about immigration vary is not surprising. Immigration, like international trade, foreign investment and other aspects of globalization, changes the distribution of income within a country. In the United States, a disproportionate number of immigrants have low skill levels, concentrating the negative labor-market effects of immigration on less-skilled U.S. residents. In 2003, 33% of foreign-born adults in the U.S. had less than 12 years of education, compared with only 13% of native-born adults. By increasing the relative supply of low-skilled labor, immigration puts downward pressure on the wages of low-skilled native-born workers. Borjas (2003) finds that between 1980 and 2000 immigration had the largest effect on the low-skilled, reducing the wages of native-born high-school dropouts by 9%.
2 Consistent with these labor-market repercussions, Scheve and Slaughter (2001c) find that opposition to immigration is higher among less-educated U.S. workers. Less-skilled laborers' skepticism about immigration mirrors their skepticism about globalization in general. 3 A second source of opposition to immigration relates to its consequences for public finances.
Low-skilled immigrants tend to earn relatively low wages, to contribute relatively little in taxes, and to enroll in government entitlement programs with relatively high frequency. There is abundant evidence that immigrants make greater use of welfare programs than natives (Borjas and Hilton, 1996; Borjas, 1999a; Fix and Passel, 2002) . This has remained true even after the 1996 reform of U.S. welfare law, which restricted immigrant access to many types of government benefits (Zimmerman and Tumlin, 1999; Fix and Passel, 2002) . In U.S. states with large immigrant populations, such as California, immigration appears to increase net burdens on native taxpayers substantially (Smith and Edmonston, 1997).
The fiscal impact of immigration is reflected in public attitudes toward immigration policy. Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2007) find that U.S. natives who are more exposed to immigrant fiscal pressures (i.e., individuals living in states that have large immigrant populations and that 2 While many early studies of the labor-market consequences of immigration found that its wage impacts were small (Borjas, 1999b) , recent studies find that immigration depresses wages for native workers who are likely to substitute for immigrant labor (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz, 1997; Borjas, 2003) . 3 See Rodrik (1997 Rodrik ( , 1998 , Scheve and Slaughter (2001a , 2001b , 2001c , 2004 , Sinnott (2001, 2003) , Mayda and Rodrik (2005) , Hainmueller and Hiscox (2004) , and Mayda (2006) . provide immigrants access to generous public benefits) are more in favor of reducing immigration. This public-finance cleavage is strongest among natives with high earnings potential (e.g., the college educated or individuals in the top income quartile), and its substantive magnitude is as large as the labor-market cleavage cited above.
In short, previous literature suggests that individual attitudes about immigration depend on an individual's skill level, the size of the immigrant population in an individual's state, and the exposure of an individual to the fiscal consequences to immigration. In this paper we add to this discussion the possibility that individuals also care about the skill composition of immigration.
In section 2, we develop a simple framework of voter preferences toward immigration. One channel through which the skill composition of immigration may affect individual policy preferences is through knowledge spillovers or other non-pecuniary externalities. As discussed above, high-skilled immigrants may bring new technology, new information about foreign markets, or new ways of doing business, any of which would increase U.S. labor demand. A second channel is through its impact on the fiscal consequences of immigration. Individuals may expect higher-skilled immigrants to generate positive net fiscal transfers to native households. If either of these channels is operative, individuals may be less opposed to immigration the more skilled is the immigrant population in their region.
This reasoning depends, of course, on holding constant other individual and regional characteristics. Obviously, high-skilled immigrants are likely to compete with high-skilled natives in the labor force, which may temper the enthusiasm of high-skilled natives for highskilled immigrant admissions. Indeed, the documented opposition of low-skilled U.S. natives to immigration appears to reflect their concerns about downward wage pressures from low-skilled immigrants. However, if high-skilled immigration creates positive fiscal benefits and/or non-pecuniary externalities, the opposition of more-skilled natives to high-skilled immigration may be weaker than the opposition of less-skilled native to low-skilled immigrant inflows.
Data for the analysis, described in section 3, come from several sources. We combine the 1992 and 2000 American National Election Studies (NES) surveys (Sapiro, et al, 1998) with data on immigrant and native populations, labor-force participation, and use of public assistance from the 1990 and 2000 U.S. Censuses of Population and Housing. Additional data includes information on state fiscal policies, in particular their welfare generosity in general and towards immigrants in particular. Our data allow us to exploit variation both across states and over time, such as the fact that some high-immigrant states (Massachusetts, New Jersey) have highly skilled immigrant populations while other high-immigrant states (Texas, Arizona) do not.
To preview the empirical results, reported in section 4, our main finding is that skill composition does matter, but not across the board. Less-skilled natives tend to support freer immigration more when living in states with a relatively skilled mix of immigrants. The sensitivity of less-skilled natives' opinions to the skill composition of immigrants resonates with earlier findings of concern over the labor-market pressures of immigration. By way of conclusion in section 5, we consider the implications of our results for political prospects of proposals to reform U.S. immigration policy.
Theoretical Framework
In this section we develop a simple framework of voter preferences to examine how cleavages regarding immigration vary across jurisdictions. While our focus is on individual economic welfare, there are surely many non-economic determinants of attitudes towards globalization. 4 These non-economic determinants we set aside for now, but they will be an important consideration in our empirical analysis.
Let V(p, I i ) be the indirect utility enjoyed by individual i, which depends on the vector of prices for consumption goods and services, p, and also on after-tax income available for consumption, I i . In turn, after-tax income depends on the pre-tax wage income, y i , the incometax rate, t i , and government transfers, g i , such that
Tax rates and government transfers vary across individuals by both state of residence and level of income. Equation (1) assumes all income is from labor earnings and only labor earnings are taxed. Neither assumption is essential, but they simplify the presentation.
First consider the impact on individual welfare of an increase in immigration. By differentiating the indirect utility function we obtain the following,
where ΔM is the change in immigration in the state in which person i resides. It is useful to reexpress this change in welfare in monetary terms. This can be done by using equation (1) to solve for ∂I i /∂M in terms of the components of after-tax income, and then dividing equation (2) by ∂V/∂I i , the marginal utility of income:
Consider the three terms on the right-hand side of equation (3). The first term is the monetary value of the utility change associated with immigration's impact on product prices. To the extent immigration lowers the price at which goods are available in individual i's state 4 See, for example, Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong (1997) , Scheve and Slaughter (2001a , 2001b , 2001c , Kessler (2001) , Sinnott (2001, 2003) , Mayda and Rodrik (2005) , Mayda (2006) , and Hainmueller and Hiscox (2004 The second term on the right of (3) is the immigration-induced change in pre-tax labor income. If immigration increases the relative supply of low-skilled labor, we expect this term to be positive for high-skilled natives and negative for the low-skilled. If the only impact of skilled immigration is on the supply of labor, we would expect the opposite signs if immigrants are predominantly high-skilled. However, to the extent that high-skilled immigrants are also a source of knowledge spillovers, ∂y i /∂M will be more positive for low-skilled individuals and less negative (or even positive) for high-skilled natives.
The third term on the right of equation (3) In states that lack generous public benefits and progressive taxation, the impact of immigration on net fiscal transfers is likely to be relatively small for either low-income or highincome individuals. For individuals in these states, the after-tax fiscal term in (3) is thus likely to be dominated by the pre-tax price and labor-income terms.
Equation ( 
Data and Summary Statistics
The main objective of our empirical work is to provide evidence evaluating the claim that individual policy preferences about immigration are associated with the skill composition of the immigrant population. The data for our analysis come from four sources. We measure individual attitudes regarding immigration using the 1992 and 2000 American National Election
Studies (NES) (Sapiro, et al, 1998) . Data on U.S. immigrants come from the 1990 and 2000 U.S.
Census of Population and Housing and the 1994-2003 U.S. Current Population Survey. Finally, data on state fiscal policies come from the U.S. Censuses of Governments.
Immigrant Populations in U.S. States
We begin our discussion of the data by showing that states vary both in their exposure to immigration and in the skill composition of their immigrant populations. Figure 1 shows the distribution of natives and immigrants by schooling category, based on U.S. census data. As is well-documented, immigrants are concentrated at the extremes of the skill distribution.
Immigrants are heavily over-represented among those with less than a high-school education, under-represented among those with a high-school degree or some college, equally represented among those with a college degree, and slightly over-represented among those with an advanced degree. Not surprisingly, educational attainment is strongly correlated with the economic performance of immigrants. In 2000, the immigrant population ratio is between 30% and 40% in two states (California, New York) and above the national average of 16.5% in eleven others. Differences in schooling between immigrants and natives affect the likelihood with which the two groups use public assistance. than native households to receive public benefits ( Figure 6 ). Since the early 1990's, researchers have consistently found that immigrants are more likely than natives to receive social assistance (Borjas, 1999a and . Given that immigrants are more likely to earn low incomes and that participation in welfare programs is means tested, this is hardly surprising. Figure 6 shows that the immigrant-native differential in overall welfare use has fluctuated over time, but does not show a consistent trend. In 1994, the share of households receiving welfare was 24.6% for immigrants and 15.3% for natives, which is the same differential (9.3%) as in 2002. This stability is perhaps unexpected in light of important recent changes in U.S.
welfare policy. In 1996, Congress undertook a major overhaul of federal welfare programs.
Among other changes, the reform excluded non-citizens from access to many benefits. Congress also substituted state entitlements to federal funds with block grants, leaving states wide discretion over individual eligibility criteria. For legal immigrants arriving before 1996, states have the option of whether to use their federal block grants to provide this group with benefits.
For legal immigrants arriving after 1996, states may not use federal block grants to provide noncitizens with benefits, but they are free to use other state funds to create substitute programs.
While the immigrant-native differential in overall welfare use hasn't changed over time, the composition of benefits received by immigrants and natives has changed. In 1994, immigrant households were 5.2% more likely than native households to receive some type of cash benefit (general assistance, AFDC, SSI) ( Figure 6 ). By 2002, this differential had fallen to 2.0%.
Similarly, between 1994 and 2002 the differential between immigrant and native use of food stamps declined from 5.3% to 1.0%. Medicaid is the only major category in which the immigrant-native welfare differential didn't fall (and in fact increased from 9.1% to 9.6%). 
Public Opinion about Immigration
To evaluate differences in individual policy preferences about immigration, a key ingredient is a measure of policy opinion. The NES is an extensive survey of individual political opinions, including opinions about immigration, based on a stratified random sample of the U.S.
population. These surveys also report details on respondent characteristics including age, 10 The Census of Population and Housing collects information on pre-tax income in the form of supplemental security income (SSI), aid for families with dependent children (AFDC, which has become temporary assistance for needy families, or TANF), and general assistance. This is a partial list of means-tested entitlement programs, as the Census does not measure non-cash benefits provided through programs such as food stamps, Medicaid, public housing, etc. (Borjas and Hilton, 1996 Our theoretical discussion in Section 2 focused on two motivations for opposition to immigration. One is the concern is that immigration put downward pressure on pre-tax wages for less-skilled workers. A number of recent papers have found evidence consistent with this prediction. 11 Another motivation for opposition to immigrants is the concern that immigration imposes a fiscal burden on native taxpayers. Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2007) find evidence consistent with this prediction. The focus of this paper is on how the skill-composition of the immigrant population affects the labor-market and public-finance consequences of immigration that individuals perceive. In the estimation, we will examine these considerations, as well as non-economic factors possibly correlated with an individual's stance on immigration (e.g., political beliefs, ethnicity). But before turning to these estimates, it is instructive to see if simple summary statistics reveal patterns consistent with these two considerations. (those with less than high school) are more opposed to immigration in states with larger immigrant populations. Since low-schooling natives are the group most exposed to labor-market competition from immigrants, it makes sense that their opposition to immigration is strongest where this competition is likely to be the most intense.
In either year, the most-educated natives (those with a college degree) are the least opposed to immigration. However, they are somewhat more opposed to immigration in states with larger immigrant populations (where this difference is larger in 1992 than in 2000). In high-immigrant states, natives with high income potential are the group most exposed to the public-finance consequences of immigration. This is suggestive evidence that individual opposition to immigration is strongest where the fiscal burden associated with immigration is likely to be greatest. However, since Table 2 does not control for individual characteristics, other than education, or for state characteristics, other than the size of the immigrant population, we should be cautious in interpreting these results. In section 4, we introduce additional controls.
To attempt to separate the labor-market versus public-finance motivations for opposition to immigration, Table 3 adds to Table 2 a breakdown of native public opinion according to whether an individual lives in a state in which immigrants have high access to public benefits. 13 In 1992 both low-educated natives and high-educated natives are more opposed to immigration in states 12 High-immigrant states are defined to be those with a ratio of immigrants to natives of at least 0.12 (the national mean in 1990). Figure 3 shows this value identifies states that are spread out from the mass of states in the bottom left with low immigrant populations in both years. 13 In 1992, before welfare reform, high-access states are those Zimmerman and Tumlin (1999) identify as having generous public benefits. In 2000, after welfare reform, high-access states are those providing generous public benefits and relatively high availability of these benefits to immigrants.
in which immigrants have high access to public benefits. The same is again true for higheducated natives in 2000. These findings, which replicate Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2007) , are consistent with the theoretical framework in section 2, in which low-income natives oppose immigration due to the perception that immigrants will crowd out their access to benefits and high-income natives oppose immigration due to the perception that immigrants will increase their net tax burden. The differential in opposition to immigration between high-access and lowaccess states declines between 1992 and 2000, after welfare reform was implemented (and many non-citizens lost access to welfare benefits). Again, Table 3 does not control for many other characteristics and so should be taken as suggestive only.
To see whether the skill composition of the immigrant population matters for attitudes about immigration policy, Tables 4 and 5 reproduce Tables 2 and 3 , adding an additional breakdown for whether a state has a high-skilled or a low-skilled immigration population. We define a highskilled immigration population as one in which the share of immigrants with 16 or more years of schooling in a state is above the national average in a given year. Table 4 shows some evidence-especially for less-skilled natives-that opposition to immigration is weaker where the immigrant population is more skilled. For more-skilled natives the reverse generally holds: in two of the three comparisons of college-graduate opinions across low-skill and high-skill immigrant states, opposition is stronger in the high-skill states. These patterns suggest that the skill composition of immigrants matters for considerations of labormarket pressures, as high-skilled immigrants presumably complement less-skilled natives but substitute for their more-skilled counterparts.
We see a similar pattern in Table 5 , which breaks down states according to immigrant access to public benefits and the skill composition of the immigrant population. In both years and both public-finance regimes, high-school dropouts are less opposed to immigration when living in states where the state immigrant population is more educated. The opposite is true for college graduates in three of the four rows of Table 5 .
Were a primary economic consequence of immigration to increase labor-market competition for natives, we would expect low-skilled natives to be more opposed to low-skilled immigration and high-skilled natives to be more opposed to high-skilled immigration. Tables 4 and 5 offer some support for this prediction. In states where the immigrant population is more skilled, lowskilled natives are less opposed and more-skilled natives are more opposed to liberalizing immigration. In section 4, we extend the analysis to a regression framework.
Before moving forward, however, it is important to discuss why we think correlations between education and opinions over immigration policy reflect labor-market issues rather than non-economic considerations such as cultural attitudes. This issue was considered in some detail in Scheve and Slaughter (2001a,c) ; here we highlight two important reasons for this interpretation.
One reason is that the education-opinion cleavage is robust to including a wide range of direct measures of non-economic considerations such as racial tolerance and attitudes towards the proper role of the United States in the world. A second reason is that the education-opinion cleavage is replicated when replacing educational attainment with alternative measures of labormarket skills, such as actual earnings (e.g., average occupational wages). We prefer education over earnings because income is well known to be poorly measured, nonrandomly missing in surveys, and sensitive to transitory shocks (e.g., illness or bonuses) that do not reflect permanent earnings power.
Individual Heterogeneity and Public Opinion
To this point, we have been treating individual location decisions and state fiscal and welfare policies as exogenous or at least pre-determined. It is instructive to consider how endogenizing these characteristics might affect the interpretation of the results. Suppose there is an unobserved characteristic of individuals (e.g., ancestry, family history, personal experience) that is correlated with individual policy preferences regarding immigration. All else equal, we would expect individuals more opposed to immigration to be more likely to reside in states with smaller immigrant populations. In Table 2 , this would lead us to understate differences in public opinion between high-immigrant and low-immigrant states (since individuals less opposed to immigration would be more likely to live in high-immigrant states). Suppose also that states whose native population is more opposed to immigration tend to enact welfare policies that are less generous toward immigrants. In Table 3 , this would again lead us to understate differences in public opinion between high-immigrant and low-immigrant states (since individuals less opposed to immigration would be more likely to live in high-immigrant-access states). It appears, then, that likely patterns of correlation between unobserved individual characteristics and state immigrant populations and welfare policies would tend to dampen regional variation in public opinion, making it harder for us to find any systematic variation in attitudes toward immigration, across either individuals or regions.
We attempt to control for non-economic factors that may affect individual attitudes toward immigration by checking the robustness of the results to the inclusion of a large set of individual characteristics as regressors. This is by no means a perfect solution to how unobserved characteristics of individuals might affect the state in which they reside, but it will give a sense of how robust the estimates are to additional covariates. We attempt to control for how heterogeneity in state native populations might have affected state welfare policies by accounting for state fixed effects in the regression. In so doing, we are assuming that changes in the state native population do not have a large effect on state welfare policies over the eight-year period that our sample covers. Given that the ranking of states in terms of their generosity toward immigrants changes relatively little over the 1990's (see Figure 7) , this assumption does not seem to be without merit. Our results are silent, however, on sources of state variation in welfare policies. By controlling for state fixed effects, identification will come from the interaction between individual characteristics and state characteristics, as we explain below.
A final issue related to unobserved sources of variation in public opinion has to do with measurement error. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) 
Empirical Results

Empirical Specification
Our theoretical discussion in Section 2 highlighted that immigration is likely to affect an individual's economic well-being via pre-tax income, post-tax net fiscal transfers, and-the main argument of this paper-perhaps by the skill mix of immigrants. Guided by this discussion, we specify a reduced-form estimating equation for individual preferences over immigration policy. lives faces a high level of fiscal exposure to immigration; X is a vector of individual-level control variables, Z is a vector of state-level control variables; α , β , δ , γ , λ , θ , and π are parameters to be estimated; and ist μ is a mean-zero random error term that reflects unobserved factors associated with individual preferences over changes in immigration policy, including the impact of immigration on unobserved determinants of wage income and fiscal transfers.
Let
The first term in this expression, 0 α , is simply a constant. The second and third terms evaluate the pre-tax income channel for how immigration and trade affect economic well-being. Our theoretical discussion suggests that all respondents should be more opposed to immigration in states with high fiscal exposure to immigrants, and that this should be especially true for high income/educated individuals due to the progressivity of state tax and transfer systems. We therefore expect parameters 4 ... 1 γ to be positive and increasing in magnitude.
The fifth term in equation (4) individual attitudes towards immigration. Some of these control variables account for the price channel through immigration affects individual utility, which depends on consumption patterns not measured in our data. Importantly, these controls may also capture some non-economic influences on policy opinions. We will report results with many additional control variables that measure tolerance, isolationist sentiment, ideology, and partisanship, all which more directly attempt to account for non-economic determinants of policy opinions.
In equation (4) 
). Assuming that the idiosyncratic component of individual preferences, μ ist , is normally distributed, then the following applies:
where Φ() is the standard normal cdf. We will estimate various specifications of equation (5) 
Estimation Results
Our baseline specification results are reported in Table 6 . Each column of Table 6 corresponds to a different specification of equation (5). We first note that the results across all four specifications replicate the finding in the literature that more-skilled natives are less likely to support immigration restrictions. Here, opposition to immigration is weakest among college graduates. The coefficients on College across all four models imply that college graduates are 17 to 26 percentage points less likely to prefer fewer immigrants than high-school dropouts.
Our main result of interest is whether support for immigration is greater in states with higher skill mixes of immigrants. Model 1 examines this idea by including as a regressor Immigration Mix; here, we implicitly restrict to be equal all four parameters This is the main finding of our paper. It is inconsistent with the hypothesis that more-skilled immigrants elicit more support for freer immigration in all natives thanks to perceived dynamic and/or non-pecuniary benefits. Instead, it resonates with earlier findings of concern over the labor-market pressures of immigration. The opposition of less-skilled natives to freer immigration is ameliorated when exposed to more-skilled immigrants that likely complement rather than substitute for them in the labor market. Table 6 examine the robustness of this interaction between native skills and immigrant skill mix by expanding the specification of equation (5) In Table 7 we examine the robustness of our Table 6 findings by adding to equation ( Table 7 that the broad pattern of Table 6 remains, but that the role for the skill mix of immigrants in shaping policy opinions is less clear.
Models 3 and 4 in
The attenuation of the results controlling for these other factors has at least three possible interpretations. First, including measures such as Ideology, Isolationism, and Tolerance risks introducing endogeneity into the analysis. For example, ideology may simply be a summary statistic of individuals' policy preferences including those about immigration policy. Second, the attenuation of these estimates may indicate that the effect of skilled-immigration on policy opinions is through these attitudinal variables. Respondents exposed to skilled immigration may, for example, develop less isolationist and more tolerant attitudes that are correlated with less restrictionist immigration policy positions. Finally, to extent that the attitudinal variables are exogenous and well measured, the attenuation of the estimates may indeed reflect that the effect of skill-immigration on policy opinions is weaker than reported in Table 6 .
In unreported results, we examined additional factors that may shape individual opinions about immigration policy. Huntington (2004) argues that opposition to immigration may be rooted not just in the skill mix of immigrants but also in the perceived negative affects that increasing cultural, ethnic, and linguistic diversity may have on the United States. He singles out immigration from Latin America, which accounts for over 50% of new immigrant inflows since 1990, as having particularly weakened American identity. To the extent there are individuals in our data who share Huntington's views, opposition to immigration as expressed in the NES may simply be proxying for opposition to Latino immigration. To examine this idea, we included controls for the share of the state immigrant population that is from Latin America. In no specification did the inclusion of this variable affect the results reported in Tables 6 and 7 .
Additionally, the variable was statistically insignificant in most regressions.
Conclusions
Voters today remain sharply divided over the proper direction for U.S. immigration controls.
In this paper we have built on earlier research examining which cleavages underlie opinions over immigration policy. We have examined whether individual opinions vary with the skill mix of state immigrant inflows, above and beyond the pre-tax labor-market and post-tax fiscal cleavages found in earlier work.
Our main finding is that skill composition does matter, but not across the board. Less-skilled natives tend to support freer immigration more when living in states with a relatively skilled mix of immigrants. The sensitivity of less-skilled natives' opinions to the skill composition of immigrants resonates with earlier findings of concern over the labor-market pressures of immigration. It does not resonate with arguments that more-skilled immigrants will be preferred because of perceived dynamic and/or non-pecuniary benefits.
One possible research extension of our study would be to examine the skill mix of local immigrants in finer detail. Our analysis uses state-level data. It might be that immigration opinions are especially sensitive to immigrant skill compositions far closer to home-e.g., by counties or metropolitan areas, rather than entire states. For geographically large and ethnically diverse states such as California, this finer focus might strengthen our somewhat mixed results.
We close with one possible policy implication suggested by our study. As discussed in the introduction, today there are many calls for a reform of U.S. immigration policy with the broad goal of overhauling admission rules to favor more-skilled immigrants. For various economic goals (e.g., maximizing the boost to national output) such an overhaul might make sense. Our findings in this paper suggest that this sort of policy reform may increase support for immigration among the native constituency most opposed to liberalization-less-skilled workers. 
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Education Notes: States with high immigrant access to public assistances are those with generous welfare benefits (in 1992) or with generous welfare benefits and high availability of these benefits to immigrants (in 2000) (see Zimmerman and Tumlin, 1999) . See Notes to Table 2 for other details. 
